Corporate religious liberty appears to be on the rise. The Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Hosanna Tabor v. EEOC (2012) 
matters involving corporate structure, employment relations, or uses of church property offlimits to the state? Moreover, to the extent that "internal governance" conflicts with government regulation, proponents fail to specify how such conflicts should be resolved. 4 Some who argue for church autonomy emphasize the method of interest balancing, in which the liberty claims of the church are set off against the state's interest in enforcing its laws. 5 This interest balancing has been formalized in statutes like the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
We think this emphasis on the "freedom of the church" and the accompanying method of interest balancing are profoundly misguided. As we have explored at length elsewhere, 6 the story of religious liberty in America is not one of mandatory religion-specific accommodations, or an autonomous domain for "the church." Instead, the roots of religious liberty can be traced to limits on the state's character. A secular government is barred, by its basic identity as expressed in the Establishment Clause, from proclaiming religious truth or adjudicating religious questions. This prohibition certainly creates a zone of non-interference, but the justification for that limit does not arise from the liberty of religious institutions.
7 4 See Richard Garnett, "The Freedom of the Church": (Towards) an Exposition, Translation, and Defense, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 33 (2013) (dismissing concern about line-drawing as common to all legal doctrines). This is not an adequate response, because one only knows the meaning of a legal norm by understanding how it applies in the context of other norms. 5 Douglas Laycock, Church Autonomy Revisited, 7 Geo. J. L. & Pub Pol'y 253 (2009) . 6 Ira C, Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Secular Government, Religious People (Wm. B. Eerdmans Co., 2014) 7 Religious institutions do enjoy robust rights of association and expression, but only to the extent enjoyed by analogous non-religious institutions. Secular Government, Religious People, chapter 5.
The misplaced emphasis on the liberty of religious institutions becomes even more problematic when coupled with the use of interest balancing to reconcile the claims of liberty with the concerns of the state. In addition to the notorious indeterminacy of interest balancing as a method, the context of religious rights raises particular problems for that method. Those problems relate directly to the core issues of the state's limited competence. In applying RFRA and its legal analogues, a court often must first decide whether a plaintiff's religious exercise has been "substantially burdened" by government action. That inquiry, if rigorously pursued, would require the court to assess the religious significance of the practice at issue. But such religious determinations are outside the state's competence.
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Our approach avoids the problems that arise from using "the freedom of the church" as the driving norm, as well as interest balancing as the method for addressing problems. Our general thesis in this chapter is that corporate entities with asserted religious identities deserve exceptional treatment only with respect to their distinctively religious activities. The state may not participate in or, other than prevention of force or fraud, regulate the distinctive aspects of religious experience: gathering for worship, religious instruction, and spiritual or sacramental celebration of life's major events.
As we explain, religious exercise may take corporate form for a wide spectrum of actions and purposes. At one end of the spectrum sit houses of worship, the paradigmatic form of religious corporation. Such entities tend to be heavily engaged in performance of distinctively religiously activities. No one questions the religious identity of such institutions, although 8 Id. at chapter 6.
questions remain about the implications that follow from such recognition. Even houses of worship act in ways that are not religiously distinctive at all. Like many secular entities, houses of worship (for example) build and use parking facilities for their members and guests, and they prepare and serve food at large gatherings they host. These kinds of activities are subject to regulation in the public interest.
In the broad middle of the spectrum are found many organizations that assert religious identities but act in ways considerably removed from the typical functions of houses of worship.
These organizations cover an immense range. They include social welfare organizations, such as shelters for the homeless or victims of domestic violence; educational institutions, ranging from pre-schools to research universities; hospitals and assisted living facilities; and many others.
Because this middle category includes such a wide variety of activities and purposes, and covers a range in size that runs from tiny neighborhood organizations to multi-billion dollar hospital chains, the category presents an endless variety of questions about how the corporations' religious identity should affect their legal rights and obligations.
The distinctive religious character of these organizations is frequently quite thin. For example, religiously affiliated hospitals are far more like secular private hospitals, or even publicly controlled hospitals, than they are like churches, mosques, or synagogues. Granted, religiously affiliated hospitals may refrain for religious reasons from offering certain services, but in what they do offer, their resemblance to all other hospitals is striking. Religious exemptions for non-profit organizations in this broad mid-range should be directly linked to the religiously distinctive activities they undertake.
At the other end of the spectrum, highlighted by the decision in Hobby Lobby, are forprofit entities that claim a religious identity, despite their full involvement in the economic marketplace. For-profit entities are strikingly similar to one another in the profit-making motives that animate them, and in the goods and services in which they traffic. Yet even for-profit firms may act in religiously distinctive ways, disconnected from profit motives, such as recognizing a In what follows, we analyze questions of corporate identity and religious exemptions along the lines we have suggested in these introductory paragraphs. The extent to which an organization and its activities are distinctively religious will go a long way in explaining when religious exemptions are appropriate. Across the board, such exemptions should be directly related to the religiously distinctive qualities the exemptions are designed to recognize and protect. Religion-specific exemptions that are unrelated to those qualities are rarely more than unjustifiable special privileges for religious entities over their secular counterparts. 9 The Hobby Lobby majority rejected that argument, and only Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor agreed with it. Justices Breyer and Kagan abstained from decision on the question.
Houses of Worship
For many traditions, the most significant religious experiences are corporate. The community of faith gathers for prayer, liturgy, and instruction. Individuals may practice aspects of the faith in isolation, but that practice is subordinate to communal experience. Characterizing that religious experience as nothing more than the associational sum of participating individuals' religious experiences misses a crucial element of corporate religious experience. In much of the Christian tradition, for example, the church itself is indispensible for salvation. It is the "Body of
Christ," in which members are united with the savior and all other believers, living and dead.
From this theological perspective, the believer's union with the sacred community is prior to and distinct from his or her individuated life in the world. Most fundamentally, the church gives life to the believer, not vice versa (as a traditional theory of associations would hold). Because of this theological priority for so many believers, any adequate account of religious freedom should acknowledge the concern about the integrity of religious community.
This theological understanding of religious entities underlies the legal assertion of "church autonomy," an institutional parallel to the idea of personal autonomy, which marks off a zone of freedom from state control. Advocates of this idea seem to believe that the only way the government can show concern for the integrity of the church is to adopt a stance of broad deference. Within the boundaries of "church," authority belongs to those assigned it by religious doctrine. The state shows its respect for the "freedom of the church" by denying that the state has jurisdiction, except in rare instances, over matters that the church deems "internal" to its faith and practice. Thus, by 1872, federal common law recognized no theory of church autonomy. Rather, the law treated houses of worship precisely as it treated other entities, except when courts were asked to resolve "strictly and purely ecclesiastical questions."
In the second half of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court reinforced and provided Similarly, if the assistant pastor of a congregation alleges that she was sexually assaulted by the congregation's senior pastor, she would certainly have tort claims against the senior pastor, and perhaps also against the congregation for negligent hiring or supervision of the senior pastor. 22 Like the rabbi's claim for back wages, the assistant pastor's claim of sexual assault would require no inquiry into ecclesiastical questions, and therefore does not implicate the constitutional concerns that justify the ministerial exception.
Another striking example of a religious exemption that cannot be traced to any distinctive limits on the state's authority in religious matters is the "parsonage exemption" from federal income tax. 23 This provision of the Internal Revenue Code exempts from the income of members of the clergy the value of housing provided by the house of worship that employs them, 21 We explore additional examples of such disputes in Ira C. Thus, government may not decide questions of that character, including who is fit to lead a congregation. In a precisely complementary norm, the government may not subsidize institutions or positions devoted primarily to such matters. Recognizing the reach and limit of these principles will take us a very long way in assessing the constitutional status of other organizations that hold themselves out as religious.
Religious Non-profit Organizations
The category of religious non-profits encompasses a broad variety of organizations.
These entities include institutions engaged in education at all levels, healthcare, social welfare services such as adoption and foster care, and faith-based political advocacy. They relate to houses of worship or religious denominations in a variety of ways, including complete control of the non-profit by a single congregation, affiliation with a denomination, sponsorship by an interfaith coalition, or complete independence from any religious body.
To what extent should the religious identity of these non-profits affect their legal rights or duties? As in the case of houses of worship, the distinctive identity of religious non-profits can have implications for both government regulation and government financial support. The concern for government involvement in the formation of religious character and the proclamation of religious ideas leads to heightened sensitivity, but not to categorical immunity from regulation or exclusion from support.
Our approach differs markedly from that of scholars who ask whether or not particular institutions have a set of designated characteristics that mark them as religious. 28 Under such an approach, if the entity satisfies that test, then it enjoys the same broad freedom from regulation as houses of worship; those who fail the test are treated identically with secular non-profits.
We think such a binary approach is unhelpful or worse. Most importantly, this approach suffers from all of the defects of the justifiably discredited concept of "pervasively sectarian"
institutions. Under the law as it stood from the early 1970's through at least the late 1990's, pervasively sectarian entities -typically, religious elementary and secondary schools --were disqualified from receiving direct public support. Such disqualification created a strong incentive for institutions to change or dilute their religious character in order to make themselves eligible for government support. A binary measure for immunity from regulation would likewise create incentives to alter or strengthen religious character as a way to obtain that benefit.
Whether the incentives are to weaken or strengthen, in either case the binary approach is an invitation to inauthenticity and manipulation of religious identity.
Even if the institutions are acting in complete good faith, the binary approach requires bureaucrats and judges to make fine-grained determinations about the extent to which an organization has a religious identity. The licensing of day care facilities, which typically involves health and safety regulations, background checks on caregivers, and occasional inspections, reflects a core exercise of the state's legitimate role in protecting children from risk. The religious identity of any particular day care center should have no bearing on the state's regulatory authority over the center, because the state's concern focuses solely on the well-being of children.
As with houses of worship, the government interacts with religious non-profits in two key areas -employment relationships and government funding. Unlike houses of worship, however, government interactions with the broader set of religious non-profits pose much more complicated questions in both areas.
Employment Relationships
Government regulation of employment relationships within religious non-profits raises a variety of constitutional and statutory issues. It seems best to begin with the ministerial exception, which rests on constitutional grounds. As we explained above, the ministerial exception significantly limits government inquiry into religious employers' decisions about certain employees. In houses of worship, the exception applies to employees whose job involves the transmission of faith. For the broader category of religious non-profits, the analysis is exactly the same. A chaplain in a religious hospital would certainly be covered, as would a professor of theology at a seminary.
Beyond the positions that replicate core aspects of the minister's role in a house of worship, religious non-profits may claim the protection of the ministerial exception for other jobs. Courts must evaluate each position, rather than categories of employees, with respect to its relationship to the purposes of the exemption. In close cases, courts should give greater deference to institutions that are directly involved in the articulation of religious ideas or delivery of religious experience, such as schools, counseling services, publishers dedicated to production of religious works, or summer camps. Correspondingly, courts should give less deference to institutions that are predominantly oriented to the delivery of discrete services with obvious secular counterparts, such as healthcare, adoption and other family services, housing, or job training. In such service organizations, courts should require strong proof that the role in question involves the explicit transmission of faith, not just a requirement to serve as a role model for the faithful.
Like houses of worship, other religious non-profits also may claim the benefit of Section 702 of Title VII -they may prefer co-religionists with respect to all employment positions.
Although the Section 702 exemption may seem uncontroversial with respect to houses of worship, its justification is less apparent when applied to all activities and positions within religious non-profits. Why should a religiously affiliated hospital be free to insist that its accountants or janitors, for example, share the faith commitments of the employer? Indeed, the original version of the Section 702 exemption was limited to employees engaged in religious activities. Congress amended Section 702 in 1972, in response to concerns about line-drawing among various jobs and the extent to which they involved religious activities.
Is the amended Section 702, which applies to all activities of religious non-profits, disproportionate to any reasonable need for exemption from anti-discrimination norms?
Although the Section 702 exemption certainly imposes costs on individuals excluded from employment because they do not share the employer's faith, the exemption nonetheless protects legitimate and distinctive concerns of faith institutions. Most importantly, the exemption permits religious non-profits to employ only individuals who share their mission. Seen in that light, the exemption is designed to avoid discrimination against religious organizations rather than respond to a religiously distinctive need for separate legal treatment. The exemption places religious non-profits on equal footing with other cause-oriented organizations. The Democratic Party may insist that all its employees be enrolled as voting Democrats; likewise, environmental groups may require all employees to embrace green commitments.
Although the protection afforded by Section 702 is thus closely linked to legitimate interests of religious institutions, a different aspect of employment law shows how protections for religious nonprofits may lack justification under any of the relevant constitutional concerns.
Under current law, adjunct faculty at colleges and universities are eligible to form unions and engage in collective bargaining with school administrators. Because of the increasing percentage of non-tenured faculty members in higher education, the right to organize offers an important protection for a large and growing body of workers. However, federal courts have ruled that the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) lacks the authority to require religious colleges to permit union organizing among, or to engage in collective bargaining with, adjunct faculty. Even at that time, however, few colleges and universities fell into the class of "pervasively sectarian" entities, and so most religious colleges qualified for a wide range of government funding programs. 34 Concerns about excessive entanglement were much less significant in that setting, so the risk of unconstitutional intrusion by the NLRB should have been correspondingly weaker. Now that the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence has refocused on the character of specific activities rather than institutions as a whole, those concerns are weaker still. Nonetheless, and despite the NLRB's continued efforts to assert jurisdiction, federal courts continue to hold that the agency has no authority over the relationship between religious colleges and their teachers. We have a great deal of sympathy with that particular concern about the NLRB's definitional approach, but not with the religious colleges' broad claim of exemption. The NLRB's test rests on a fundamental error. Whatever justification the Court had for exempting parochial schools in Catholic Bishop, no such rationale can support the current categorical exemption of religious colleges from NLRB jurisdiction. Any concerns about NLRB intrusion in religious education can be handled by regulatory measures far more precise than the categorical exemption of religious higher education. For example, the college could be required to bargain only over a set of indisputably secular conditions of employment, such as wages and hours, benefits, or office space. That more refined treatment of religious colleges, unlike the current institutional exclusion, satisfies the concern for treatment that is closely tailored to distinctive limits on the state's power in dealing with religious matters.
Government Funding
Over the last two decades, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on government funding of faith-based institutions has taken a dramatic turn. During the 1970s, the Court adopted a categorical prohibition on government aid for "pervasively sectarian" organizations. 35 Under that formulation, the Establishment Clause barred government support for entities that engage in worship and explicitly religious instruction. As a practical matter, the litigation involved religious primary and secondary schools, usually Catholic. Virtually everyone at the time assumed that the ban encompassed all houses of worship, and as a matter of logic, it also included religious non-profits primarily engaged in faith-intensive forms of social service.
By the early years of the 21 st century, however, the Court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause considerably narrowed the prohibition on state funding of religion. In place of a prohibition on aid for "pervasively sectarian" institutions, the Court found two paths to a much wider range of funding for religious non-profits. First, in accord with the general themes of this chapter, the Court shifted from an institutional focus to a more precise prohibition on government funding of "specifically religious" activities. 36 The category of "pervasively sectarian" entities is now irrelevant as a matter of constitutional law, but the distinction between secular and specifically religious activity remains central. Second, the Court distinguished direct aid from indirect aid, such as voucher-based financing of private schools. 37 The ban on funding of "specifically religious activities" applies to any program in which the government provides direct support, such as subsidy for the salaries of personnel or payment of overhead expenses.
When government aid depends solely on the uncoerced choice of program beneficiaries, however, the institution to which the beneficiary directs the aid is free to provide services intertwined with specifically religious content. This shift to the two-path structure of Establishment Clause law represents a significant opening for religious institutions to participate in programs of government-funded social welfare services. Some who assert the "freedom of the church," however, believe that the current structure remains unduly restrictive. By forbidding direct aid to faith-integrated programs, they claim, the government discriminates against religious providers who are not willing or able to segregate secular and religious elements of their programs, as well as those whose services do not fall within programs of indirect financing.
What these critics see as discrimination, we view as appropriate and focused concern for important constitutional values. Our counterarguments are grounded in the fundamental character of civil government, as well as respect for the dignity of program beneficiaries. As we explain in our book, 39 a core characteristic of the American experiment has been its commitment to the secular character of civil authority. Among the most important aspects of that character is the idea that civil government should not use religion as a means to the state's own ends, however laudable those goals might be. The concern for the dignity of program beneficiaries, by contrast, is recognized -or at least conceded -by even the most religion-friendly architects of the relationship between government and faith-based service providers. Put most simply, programs that receive direct government aid may not condition the delivery of government-financed services on the willingness of beneficiaries to engage in religious activities. Any specifically religious activities offered by such programs must be distinct from the government-funded services, and completely voluntary for beneficiaries. To require less than that would be to deny the fundamental dignity of aid beneficiaries, by exposing them to religious coercion as the price of receiving public assistance.
Advocates of a strong "freedom of the church" have been especially concerned about the possibility that receipt of government support will bring limitations on providers' right to prefer co-religionists in delivering those services. Prior to the Faith-Based Initiative, most federal agencies required all grant recipients to refrain from engaging in various forms of employment discrimination, including based on religion. The agencies provided no exception to religious grantees. Thus, any religious entity that received public funding was required to agree not to prefer co-religionists in employment. The rules that emerged under the Faith Based Initiative directly and immediately address this concern. Unless funding statutes require otherwise, the rules assure faith-based grant recipients that their freedom to prefer co-religionists would be preserved.
For-Profit Corporations
As we explained at the beginning of the chapter, corporate entities, including businesses, have the legal right to adopt and manifest a religious identity. The decision to claim a religious identity belongs to those who have legal control over the entity. Others have unpacked the complex issues of corporate law embedded in that decision, including questions concerning how disagreements among owners, or related issues of control, affect the entity's claim of a religious identity. But, from our perspective, that claim is a private matter to be resolved among the corporation's constituents by ordinary legal norms.
Our focus is limited to the implications that should follow from that assertion. From the law's perspective, a corporation's assertion of a religious identity will only matter when the manifestations of that identity collide with the entity's legal duties to employees, customers, and others. The most frequent locus for these collisions is the employment relationship, and we turn to that first, before considering relationships with customers.
Employees
In what ways might the religious identity of a for-profit corporation make a difference for its employees? Some businesses have argued that, in order to fully embrace their religious identity, employment must be restricted to those who share the faith commitments of the business owners. 41 Other businesses have required employees to participate in religious observances during the work day, and have disciplined employees who fail to do so. These employers' practices would seem obviously to violate Title VII, which prohibits employment discrimination based on religion. But, in these instances, the employers have argued that they fall within Title VII's exemption for religious entities. The exemption reads:
This subchapter shall not apply to . . . a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities.
The governing law interpreting this exemption limits it to entities that are "primarily religious" in their character and activities. This limitation applies to both non-profit and for-profit entities.
Indeed, the EEOC has ruled ineligible a number of prominent non-profits that have religious 41 McClure v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985) .
origins, affiliations, and titles, because the organizations' activities no longer reflected significant religious content.
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Although for-profit entities are theoretically capable of meeting the "primarily religious" standard, no judicial decision has ever extended the exemption to a for-profit business. We think this would be a profound mistake. Recall that the original version of § 702 exempted religious organizations from Title VII's ban on religious discrimination only with respect to employees that are directly engaged in religious activities. Congress broadened the exemption to avoid line-drawing problems, but in doing so has already removed a significant number of non-religious jobs from the protections of Title VII.
Broadening the number of exempted employers -and jobs -has two problematic consequences. First, it further limits employment opportunities on the basis of religion, and thus conflicts with one of the central purposes of Title VII, which is designed to reduce status-based barriers to employment. Second, permitting even more employers to select employees based on religion would increase religion-based segregation within society, as what used to be religiously diverse workplaces became religiously insular. We firmly believe that religious equality in the labor market has promoted civic harmony, and helped to mitigate the divisiveness and conflict that have plagued other parts of the world.
The traditional limitation of the § 702 exemption to entities that are "primarily religious"
in their character and activities seems to us a much better way of reconciling the competing concerns. In applying that standard, the EEOC and courts should be open to the possibility of for-profit employers qualifying as "primarily religious." The best candidates for that status would be businesses whose productive activities involve goods or services that have thickly religious content. For example, a store exclusively devoted to selling books and other goods linked to a particular faith tradition should qualify as "primarily religious."
Even if an entity does so qualify, it still may enjoy some legal protection for employment decisions that affect the religious character of the organization. If a for-profit corporation hires an employee specifically to advance its religious mission, that employee may well fall within the scope of the ministerial exception. To the best of our knowledge, all reported decisions that involve the ministerial exception have arisen in the context of a house of worship or a religious non-profit entity. But we see no reason in principle that a for-profit entity would be barred from raising the ministerial exception. The best argument against allowing the owners to assert the ministerial exception is that expanding the doctrine to encompass for-profit entities presents a problem of the slippery slope.
Could the employer then designate a significant portion of the workforce as "missionaries," who spend most of their day performing ordinary tasks, but also have some responsibility for "ministerial duties" such as leading prayer or sharing religious messages with customers? Recall that Cheryl Perich, the plaintiff in Hosanna-Tabor, spent the bulk of her work hours in secular teaching and related duties. The predominance of secular tasks did not remove Perich from the class of "ministerial" employees. But that conclusion reflects an implicit judgment about the employer, a religious school. Given that the school's mission included inculcation of the faith, the Supreme Court appropriately deferred to the school's decision about how to allocate responsibilities for leading the children in prayer and worship.
For entities that are not engaged in "primarily religious" activities, however, we would expect the ministerial exception to take on a far more limited character. Where the Court in Hosanna Tabor substantially deferred to the religious entity's allocation of responsibilities, a business entity should only be able to claim the exception with respect to positions that have exclusively and explicitly religious duties. Moreover, the employer should clearly communicate to the employee both the religious character of the duties and the legal consequences that follow from that ministerial character.
Customers
A religious business is also likely to manifest its religious identity in relationships with customers. We have written about the complicated issues that arise when business entities decide, on religious grounds, not to serve particular classes of customers. 47 The most prominent recent examples include some businesses' refusal to serve same-sex couples, or to provide goods for use at same-sex weddings. We think that the public character of these businesses, the sweep of goods and services that such refusals might cover, and the risks of both material and stigmatic harm to same sex couples counsel strongly against exemptions of such businesses from relevant anti-discrimination laws.
A very different set of issues arises when the government attempts, or is asked by consumers, to regulate the religious quality of goods sold by a business. When a business advertises that its meat is "100% kosher," should a court or government agency be able to decide By contrast, the state should be able to adjudicate whether specific factual assertions by merchants are truthful. Such assertions include what animal, or part of an animal, particular meat comes from, as well as whether the meat has been inspected and approved by a specific religious authority. These are questions of objectively verifiable fact; neither involves the content of religious norms, or appraisals of fidelity to them. Questions of that type are off-limits to the government, even if they arise in a context where commercial fraud is a possibility. States must find secular avenues for policing such fraud, and leave religious policing to private parties, including customers and religious authorities.
Conclusion
As readers of this volume know, a number of other scholars in the field are drawn to sweeping generalizations about "church autonomy" and "freedom of the church." In past writing, they have been willing to leave to another day the hard questions raised by their approach -in particular, who qualifies as "the church," and in what specific contexts should the state treat "the church" as autonomous. We think this failure to attend to particular and difficult questions is the path to over-broad regimes of religious exemption and unjustified norms of religious privilege.
48 See Mark Popovsky, The Constitutional Complexity of Kosher Food Laws, 44 Columbia J. L.
